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HEIDIMARIE FOULGER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
JOHN C. FOULGER, 
I:efendant and 
Appellant. 
JN TiiE SUPREME COURr 
OF THE STATE OF urAH 
Case No. 16,909 
BRIEF OF DEF'END\NT - APPELIANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken frcxn a final order issued by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court presided over by the Honorable David Sam and 
entered February 4th,1980, which m:x:lified the provisions of Paragraph 5 
of a I:ecree of Divorce entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif, in 
the SaJ:IE Court October 29,1975. 
DISPOSITION IN THE ill\TER COURr 
A hearing on the plaintiff-respondent's application for rroiification 
of the original Divorce D=cree was held D2cernb2r 18,1979. On February 
4th, 1980, the trial Court entered an Order granting the respon:Jent's 
application to increase thEi child support provisions of the original r:J=cree 
and modify the pro,perty settlerrent provisions. It ::..s fran the Order 
modifying the property settlenent provisions tha~ t1-:is a:=peal is taken. 
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RELIEF SOlQIT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the Trial Court's 
order--arrending the property disIX>sition provision of the Decree of 
Divorce d-ted October 29,1975, and to reinstate that Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On. October 29, 19·75, a default Divorce D2cree was entered grant-
ing a divorce to the respondent, paragraph 5 of which provided as 
follows: 
The plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and interest 
in and to the real pro:p2rty and residenre at 195 North 7th 
East, Pleasant Grove, Utah, described as folla.vs, to-wit: 
Canrrencing at the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 43, 
Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Survey; thence South lll.10 
feet; thence West ill. 60 feet; thence North lll.10 feet; 
thence East 111. 60 feet to beginning. 
subject, ho...;ever, to a lien on said premises in behalf of 
the defendant equal to 50% of the arrount received fran any 
sales in excess of $17,000.00, which is the purchase prire 
of said residence. D2fendant is further awarded a first 
option to purchase said residence in the event of sale and 
apply his equity upon said purchase price. Plaintiff is 
hereby granted the right to reside in said residence as 
long as she so desires, but in the event of sale, the above 
formula shall apply." 
This provision was entered folla.ving the Court's ar:proval of a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement which had been executed 
by both parties hereto on September 12, 1975, paragraph 4 of which con-
tained the provision cited above. 
In the original pleading the respondent was represented by Heber 
Grant Ivins, an attorney locate:l in American Fork, Utah. The Settlement 
- 2 -
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Agreenent was prepared by him. The appellant was not represented in 
said proceedings. (Transcript page 25) 
Respondent's application to nodify the provisions setforth above 
was heard on an Order to ShON Cause ref ore the Honorable David Sam on 
I:ecember 18,1979. In that proceeding the respondent contemed that 
paragraph 5 should be arrended lJecause she had been residing in the hone 
since the divorce decree was entered, h~d made all of the rrortgage pay-
rrents, paid all of the taxes and insurance, had installed carpet in two 
\ 
roans, wants to finish the baserrent and took the position that it is not 
fair to allow the apepellant to continue to share in the hare's appreciated 
value beyond the date of the original divorce decree. (Order to Show Cause 
and Affidavit in re Modification of Divorce dated Noverrber 19,1979) 
The appellant contends that the circumstances surrounding the original 
stipulation and settlerrent Agreerrent and its subsequent approval by the 
trial couit have not changed, except for sbrre anticipated irrproverrents to 
re made to the hare by the respondent, and that the payrrent of taxes, insur"."" 
ance and mortgage installm:mts by the respondent were all anticipated at t:11e 
tine she was awarded the hare. ·He is not interested in sharing any increases 
in the value of the hare which may result fran the installation of new perm-
anent .irrproverrents, but desired when the n=cree was entered into and continues 
to desire to share in any increase in value resulting from the efforts of 
reither party but rrerely frorn changes in the over....,all suate of the econany. 
- 3 -
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The Appellant testified that he had a specifi~ purpose in setting 
no tine limit on the sale of the hone, but in having his interest in the 
hare remain at 1/2 of the sale value in order to induce the Respondent 
to remain in the horre ?Ild to not sell it without the penalty of having to 
pq.y 50% of the proceeds to him, because he wanted his children to remain 
in the area and was apprehensive that the Respondent may return to Gennany 
where she had lived prior to caning to the United States. ( See transcript 
page 61) The Respondent denies that this was the rrotive for that type 
of disposition on the hare and essentially testified that she was not totally 
aware of the negotiations between her counsel and the Appellant and ~as 
under a great deal of stress at the tille (Page 66 Transcript • 
.ARGUMENI' ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL CDURT'S ORDER GRANTING.RESPONDENT'S PEI'ITICN 'IO AMEND 
THE PROPERTY SETILEMENT PROVISIONS OF. THE ORIGINAL~DE6IBE OF DIVORCE IS 
Nor SUPPORTED·BY ANY MA..'IERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
. .• 
No appeal having been taken from t~e Judgrrent entered on Octcber 29,1975, 
it beCaITE absolute and final and could not properly be changed or m:xlified 
except for a change in circumstances, to the end that the same matters will 
not be litigated anew and one trial Judge will not be passing judgrrent upon 
the acts of another. (See 1\lein v. l'le in, 54 4, P. 2d 4 7 2 ) 
In her application for Order to Shoo cause the Respondent requested 
- 4 -
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the Court to rocx:lify the original Divorce ~cree in ~ ways. First, 
she wished the Court to increase the child support provisisions and the 
Court did. With this we do not quarrel arrl it is not challenged in tl1is 
appeal. 
The trial Court' s determination to rrodify the pr~rty disp >Si tioo 
provisions of Paragraph 5 to cut off the Appellant's equity interest in 
the the hate effective Octorer 29,1975, supported by its Findings of 
Fact No. 9, in which it finds the original provisions to be "inherently 
unfair" insofar as it penni ts the Appellant to share in any on-going 
appreciation in value while requiring the Respondent to nake all the 
paym:mts on the property, including taxes and insurance. It also arrived 
at that conclusion based on Findings Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 that circum-
stances have changed in that the Respondent has not yet returned to 
Germany and was likely not to, had made all of the house payments, tax 
payiTents and insurance payrrents on the residence without assistance 
fran the Appellant. 
It is respectfully submitted that these are not changes of circumst-
ances compelling the alteration made to the original D:?cree. Those ar~ not 
circurnstancial changes at all. Obviously, that was contemplated to be the 
future case at the tirre the original Decree was entered. 'Ihe respondent 
just doesn't like it nCM. 
'Ihe respondent contended and the Court found that to allCM the 
Appellant to share in any increase in value to the prqJerty because of 
:i.mproverrents made by the Respondent subsequent to the Divorce D:?cree is 
- 5 -
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absolutely true. The Appellant has no interest in that typ= of profit, 
but it doesn't corrpel or justify depriving him of all increases in value 
if those increases are caused by neither of the parties to this action. 
POINT II 
THE REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION PROVISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE WERE NOI' PATENTLY UNFAIR 'IO THE RESPONDENT, WERE APPROVED 
BY THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT PURSUANT 'IO AN ARM.S-LENGTI:I STIPUIATICN AND 
SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CANNCYI' BE AMENDED UNLESS FRAUD, DURESS OR 
UNDUE INFLUENCE IS SHOWN AND NO St.al SHCWTIG WAS MADE. 
It is respectfully submitted that a Divorce ~cree providing for 
the equal division of the equity from the sale of the hare, after deduct-
ing those amounts paid by the Respondent on the original mortgage while 
allowing the Resp:mdent to live there in return for making the payrrents 
on the mortgage, the taxes, the insurance and the rna.intenance is not 
patently unfair. This is particularly true where the home is the 
principal asset acquired by the parties during their marriage. 
Even if a preponderance of the evidence support the finding that it 
is unfair, the Respondent is still not entitled to set it aside sirrply 
because she made a bad bargain. 
It has been repeatedly held that no Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement between the parties to a Divorce proceeding is necessarily bind-
ing upon the Court and is rrerely advisory in nature. Once it is approved by 
the trial Court, and incorporated in and made a part of the ~cree of Divorce 
- 6 -
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beCOlEs a final judgnent of the Court and should not be disturb..~ m trely 
because one or the other of the parties subsequently changes their mi.rrl. 
Particularly should this be true where the agree:rrent was pnpared by ca.msel 
for the Respondent and contained terms negotiated in an arms-length trans-
action. (See Saudi.v. Saudi 360 P2nd 998, 83 Idaho 233 and Hughes vs. 
I.eonard 66 Colo. 500 181 P. 200). 
The provisions of 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated provides among other things, 
that " •.•.•••.••• the Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such 
subsequence changes or new orders with respect to the support and rraintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support and maintenance, 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and recessary ..... " 
It is respectfully submitted that this provision should not be construed to 
grant to the trial Court the power to give or take away property between the 
parties to a divorce action indefinitely unless it makes a specific reservatio~ 
of jurisdiction to do so in the original Decree. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The record in this proceeding does not support any findings by the 
trial Court that circumstances have changed since the entry of the original 
D=cree of Divorce which would justify the arrendrrent made to that Iecree insofar 
as the property settlerrent provisions are concerned. If the Court were to 
enter an arrendenent to the Decree excluding the Appellant fran participating 
in any increases in value resulting fran inproverrentrs made by the Respondent 
the Appellant has no objection. That is only fair. 
M:>re inp:lrtantly, hc:wever, it is respectfully suhnitted that this Court 
should look at adopting a rule in such cases which would rrake the property 
divisions of a Settlerrent Agreerrent pennanent, final and unreviewable except 
- 7 -
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through normal appeal channels once they are approved by the Court, in-
ex>rporated into the provisions of the Final U=cree of Divorce and made 
the Judgrrent of the Court, unless fraud, duress or.undue influence is 
involved, or unless the Court chooses to retain jurisdiction to review the 
matter at a subsequent time. Any other interpretation of the provisions 
of 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Armotated may result in gross injustice and 
places litigants in a position where they can never cxmnt on pennanently 
a.ming anything they have acquired. Sirrply because a person is subjected 
to the juriscli~tion of ,the Co'urt because he becorres. di vor~d shouldn 1 t JIEan tl 
his property is ·forever sUbject to the power of the Court to take it CJYJa.y 
from him. At sane point in time he should be in a position where he can 
count on keeping what has been awarded to him. What better point to draw 
the line than when the U=cree becc:xres absolute and the normal appeal V1IE 
has expired. 
Obviously such a rule cannot be the case where alimony and child 
support provisions are concerned. But . even with these provisions there is 
a point at which they tenninate.· If the decision of the low=r Court in this 
case that a property settlerrent can be reviewed anytfune and. can be changed 
if found to be unfair after previously having reen approved, then the point 
at which the Court's jurisdiction canes to an end is never reached. Such a 
rule would appear to be intolerable and does not seem to be the position 
taken by the rna.jori ty of the Courts who have considered the issue. (See 
Kinze v. ~ze, 231 cal. App. 2d 219, 41 cal Rptr 802 - Irwin v. Irwin, 150 
Colo. 261, 372 P. 2nd 440 and Ross v. Ross 403 P. 2nd 19 (Oregon). 
- 8 -
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It is respectfully su1:rni tted that the jtrlgrrent of the l<:7M~ Court 
arrending the provisions of paragraph 5 of the ~cree of Divoroo entered 
October 29,1975, should be reversed. 
DATED this ~day of .May,1980. 
8 North Center Street 
.American Fork, Utah 84003 
Attorney for r.eferrlant-Appellant 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief to Craig Snyder, 120 East 
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, this 
IJTt. day of May,1980. 
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